What RESPA section 9 says about choosing a title company

1. The prohibition, and the qualifiers a summary drops

Subsection (a) is one sentence, quoted below exactly as the Office of the Law Revision Counsel prints it. The figure beneath sets out the three things the sentence names and the one place it is silent; the two things worth reading slowly are both qualifiers.

The first is on the verb. The word is "require", and it is immediately widened by "directly or indirectly" — so on the face of the text the prohibition is not written only about an express term of a contract. The requirement also has to operate "as a condition to selling the property", which is a second qualifier on the same verb rather than a restatement of it.

The second is on the object. What may not be required is that title insurance covering the property be purchased by the buyer from "any particular title company". The load is carried by the word "particular", which a reader skimming for the words "title insurance" will pass straight over.

The sentence addresses a seller of property and names no other party — not an agent, not a broker, not a lender, not a title company — and subsection (b) confirms it by making a seller the one who is liable.

What the sentence does not contain matters as much, and because the whole section is printed here it can be checked rather than believed. It says nothing about who bears the cost of a title policy: neither of the two sentences carries an exception keyed to which side of the transaction pays for it. Both sentences do speak about payment — subsection (a) about title insurance being purchased by the buyer, subsection (b) about the charges made for it — but neither turns on which party the money comes from. It says nothing about a seller recommending, suggesting or naming a company. It does not address a lender's own requirements, a brokerage's vendor list, or anything a buyer settles on for themselves. None of that is a permission — other law may speak where these sentences are silent, and several layers of it are named at the foot of this page and quoted nowhere on it.

2. What “title company” covers, and which words are left open

Section 2608 sits in chapter 27 of title 12, and some of the words it uses are supplied by a definitions section elsewhere in that chapter. That section is addressed to the chapter as a whole, in the words it opens with, quoted below. Where §2608 uses one of the terms it lists, the listed meaning is the one in play rather than the everyday sense of the phrase.

Two of the words in subsection (a) are terms defined that way, and both are quoted on this page. "Federally related mortgage loan" is the qualifying phrase and has section 3 to itself. The other is "title company", below, and it is wider than the phrase sounds: it reaches any institution qualified to issue title insurance — directly or through its agents — and the definition then adds that the term also refers to any duly authorized agent of a title company. So an arrangement pointing at a duly authorized agent rather than at the institution behind it is still pointing at something the chapter calls a title company — the qualifier being the words "duly authorized", which the definition carries and this sentence does not drop.

The rest of the sentence is left open. "Seller", "buyer", "title insurance", "particular" and the verb "require" all appear in subsection (a) without a definition in either paragraph quoted below. Whether any of them is given a meaning elsewhere in the chapter or in the regulation is a question about documents this page quotes only in part — the full definitions section is at the URL beneath the quotes, and the section 8 article linked at the foot of this page quotes it paragraph by paragraph. Section 4 quotes the one place in Regulation X that the "Title companies" section itself sends a reader to.

3. Which purchases the section is written about

Everything in subsection (a) hangs off one description: property "that will be purchased with the assistance of a federally related mortgage loan". The four words "with the assistance of" carry no definition in the paragraphs quoted here. The three-word term that follows them does, and that definition is the longest thing on this page.

It is worth describing by its plumbing rather than by any test, because the plumbing is all the quoted words support. The definition opens with a chapeau ending in a dash, then runs a subparagraph (A) that closes with the word "and", then a subparagraph (B) whose four clauses are joined to each other by the word "or" — printed at the end of the first three, with the fourth closing the run on a semicolon. Subparagraph (A) describes collateral: a lien on residential real property, first or subordinate, condominium and cooperative units included, on a building designed principally for one to four families. Subparagraph (B) describes the lender or where the loan is headed — a federally insured or federally regulated lender; a loan insured, guaranteed, supplemented or assisted by a federal officer or agency; a loan intended for sale to one of the named secondary-market entities; or a loan from a "creditor" as title 15 uses that word, lending above a yearly volume figure the clause itself states.

Two features of the drafting cut against reading that structure as a closed test. The term is introduced with "includes" rather than "means". And the opening parenthetical takes something out of the term by name — temporary financing such as a construction loan. This page therefore does not tell a reader that (A) and one clause of (B) are the necessary and sufficient conditions of the phrase; it prints all six units and lets the connectives speak.

Which leaves the reader's question in the shape it actually has. Subsection (a) speaks to property that will be purchased with the assistance of a loan answering the words below. Whether a given purchase answers them — a cash sale, a seller-financed sale, a portfolio loan, a construction-to-permanent arrangement — is a question about that purchase and that loan, on facts this page does not have.

4. The regulation, and the phrase it points at

The RESPA regulation is Regulation X, at 12 C.F.R. part 1024, and it has a section headed "Title companies". It is §1024.16, it is one paragraph long, and it is quoted below in full.

Notice what that paragraph does. Its first sentence states the prohibition by reference to the statute rather than restating it — the seller is not to violate section 9 of RESPA, with the U.S. Code citation in parentheses. Its second sentence is a pointer: it says that §1024.2 defines "required use" of a provider of a settlement service. That is the whole section. It adds no element, no exception and no procedure of its own.

So the reading runs one step further, into the regulation's definitions, and two paragraphs there matter before the definition itself. Paragraph (a) states how the regulation treats the statute's vocabulary: all terms defined in RESPA are used in accordance with their statutory meaning unless otherwise defined in paragraph (b) or elsewhere in the part. Paragraph (b) then opens the list of the regulation's own terms with the words "As used in this part".

The definition is drafted as a situation rather than as an act, and it has two limbs joined by "and": a person must use a particular provider of a settlement service in order to have access to some distinct service or property, AND that person will pay for the provider's settlement service or will pay a charge attributable, in whole or in part, to it. It then carves out packages and discounts — offering a package or combination of settlement services, or discounts or rebates for buying several, does not constitute a required use — and then states three further requirements in three sentences of its own: the package or discount has to be optional to the purchaser, the discount has to be a true discount below prices otherwise generally available, and it must not be made up by higher costs elsewhere in the settlement process.

One more thing sits in the same definitions section and is quoted below because leaving it out would invite a wrong inference. Regulation X defines "Title company" for the part in its own words, and they are not the statute's words: the regulation's sentence is shorter than §2602(4)'s. Both are printed on this page. Which one governs a given question is a matter for §1024.2(a)'s displacement rule, quoted above, read against the document the question is about — and this page does not resolve it.

One inference is deliberately not drawn here, and the omission is the point of the section. It is natural to read §1024.16's pointer as saying that the defined phrase is the test for the verb "require" in §2608(a). The regulation does not say that, the definition does not say it, and this page does not say it. Both texts are printed; what one does to the other is a question for a lawyer reading them against a set of facts.

5. What subsection (b) attaches to a violation

The second subsection is the other half of the section, and it is also one sentence: a seller who violates subsection (a) is liable to the buyer in an amount equal to three times all charges made for such title insurance.

Three things in it are worth reading slowly. WHO IS LIABLE: any seller who violates subsection (a) — the party the prohibition addresses, and no other. TO WHOM: the buyer, named directly, so the liability runs to the person on the other side of the transaction rather than to a public official. AND WHAT IS MULTIPLIED: "all charges made for such title insurance". Not the seller's benefit from the arrangement, not the difference between what the buyer paid and what some other company would have charged, and not the price of the property. The multiplicand is the charges for the title insurance itself, and the multiplier is three.

Because the whole of §2608 is printed on this page — subsection (a) in section 1, subsection (b) here, and there is no subsection (c) — some things can be observed by counting rather than asserted. The section carries no criminal penalty. It names no official who may sue to enjoin a violation. It contains no attorney-fee provision, no bona fide error defence, and no statement about state law. Whether any of those exist elsewhere is a separate question; the observation here is only about the two sentences quoted.

6. The clock, and the two periods the chapter sets

Subsection (b) creates a liability and says nothing about how long it lasts. That is in a different section of the same chapter — §2614, headed "Jurisdiction of courts; limitations" — and it names §2608 expressly, which is why it is quoted here in full rather than pointed at. It is one paragraph and does three jobs at once.

It states where an action may be brought: the United States district court or any other court of competent jurisdiction, for the district in which the property involved is located, or where the violation is alleged to have occurred.

It then sets two different periods in one clause. For a violation of §2607 or §2608 the paragraph says one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation; for a violation of §2605 it says three years. And it closes with an exception that turns on WHO is suing rather than on which section was violated: actions brought by the Bureau, the Secretary, the Attorney General of any State, or the insurance commissioner of any State may be brought within three years from the date of the occurrence of the violation.

Two of those four actors are defined terms the chapter supplies for itself, and both are quoted below so the sentence can be read without leaving the page: the "Secretary" is the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and the "Bureau" is the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. The two state officials are named in the paragraph and are not defined in either definition quoted below.

When a period of that kind starts and stops in a particular case, and what if anything affects it, are questions decided on facts and on case law — neither of which is on this page.

Where each of the opening situations lands in the text

This page opened with four situations. What follows is not an answer to any of them — it is the words each one runs into, so the reading starts in the right place instead of at a search result.

All four meet the same description first, because it qualifies the whole sentence: whether the property is one that will be purchased with the assistance of a federally related mortgage loan as §2602(1) sets that term out. That question is about the loan, not about the title company, and a purchase outside the description is outside the sentence quoted in section 1.

The counter-offer naming a closer runs into §2608(a)'s two qualifiers — the verb widened by "directly or indirectly", and the requirement having to operate "as a condition to selling the property" — and then into the word "particular", with §2602(4) supplying what "title company" covers.

The builder incentive meets the same words, and then §1024.16's pointer into §1024.2, where the two limbs of the defined phrase and the package-and-discount carve-out with its three conditions are the text in play.

The buyer asking mid-settlement whether they were ever allowed to pick is asking about §2608(a), about §2608(b) — where the party who recovers is the buyer and the multiplicand is "all charges made for such title insurance" — and, once any of that is in issue, about the period §2614 sets.

And the agent asking whether this is federal or local is asking a question the page can only half answer: §2608, §2614 and §1024.16 are federal and are quoted here in full; the state title, licensing and closing-practice layers are named below and quoted nowhere on this page.

These are pointers, not a checklist. Naming the words a question runs into is not the same as naming every provision that bears on it, and nothing here claims to have listed them all.

Checking the quotes, and what they do not cover

The completeness claim on this page is narrow and it is meant to be checked. Section 2608 has two subsections and both are quoted above — the prohibition in section 1, the remedy in section 5 — so the statute itself is complete on the page, which is what makes the counting observations in section 5 checkable rather than asserted. Section 2614 is one paragraph, quoted whole. From the chapter definitions, ten units are quoted: the chapeau, paragraphs (4), (6) and (9), and paragraph (1) together with all five of the lettered and numbered units printed under it — four of that section's nine numbered paragraphs. From Regulation X, §1024.16 is quoted whole and four units of §1024.2 are quoted. Eighteen quotations in all.

What is not complete is equally explicit, and five things are named here and quoted nowhere on this page. The other five numbered paragraphs of §2602 are neither quoted nor described here; the section 8 article linked below quotes all fifteen units of that section. The rest of chapter 27, the chapter all three quoted U.S. Code sections sit in: no other section of it is quoted here, including the two that §2614 names in the text above. The rest of part 1024, where §1024.2 defines many terms besides the two printed above and this page says nothing about the others. State law, in two forms — a state's own regulation of title insurance and closing practice, and its licensing rules for agents — with local custom about which side pays for which policy a third thing again, and not law at all. And case law: no judicial opinion is quoted or described anywhere on this page.

The links are free to open. The U.S. Code quotes go to the Office of the Law Revision Counsel rather than to a numbered edition, and the regulation quotes go to eCFR, whose "as of" date for the title is printed beside each entry in the source list below. A numbered edition is a frozen snapshot, so re-reading one returns the same words forever even after the law has changed; both publishers used here serve the text as it currently stands, and each quote also carries the date it was loaded.

What the page cannot do is apply any of it. Whether a term in a contract, an incentive, or a set of closing instructions amounts to requiring — directly or indirectly, as a condition to selling — that title insurance be purchased from a particular company is decided on facts and on authorities this page does not quote. The gap between "the statute says this" and "so this arrangement is fine" is exactly the gap a lawyer is for.

Real Deal Pro, Inc. is a software company. It is not a real estate brokerage, not a title company, not a title insurance agency, not a mortgage lender and not a law firm. Nothing here is legal advice or a compliance opinion; for an actual transaction, ask a lawyer who practises in this area, and for anything touching a licence, ask your broker and the commission in your state.

Wrapping up

Two of the words in section 9 come from the chapter's own definitions. "Title company" reaches an institution qualified to issue title insurance and also any duly authorized agent of one. "Federally related mortgage loan" is set out as a chapeau, a collateral description closing with "and", and four clauses joined to each other by "or", introduced by "includes" rather than "means" and with temporary financing such as a construction loan taken out of the term by name.

Regulation X adds one section on this subject, §1024.16, which states the prohibition by reference to the statute and points at the definition of "required use" in §1024.2. Both are quoted here, and the relationship between that definition and the statute's verb is left exactly where the regulation leaves it. Section 2614 supplies the clock: one year for a violation of §2608 from the date of the occurrence, and three years for actions brought by the four it names on the other side of that exception.

What none of it supplies is an answer about a particular counter-offer, incentive or closing instruction. That is decided on facts, on case law, and often on a state's own rules — none of which is on this page.

Related reading

• What RESPA section 8 actually prohibits

  The other RESPA prohibition agents meet, and the chapter definitions quoted in full

• How the affiliated business arrangement disclosure works: 12 CFR §1024.15 and appendix D, quoted whole

  The Regulation X "required use" definition and the affiliated business arrangement conditions, quoted whole

• Which loans RESPA reaches: 12 CFR §1024.5, the coverage section, quoted in full

  Which loans the regulation says RESPA reaches, and the exemptions, quoted in full

• How the Closing Disclosure three-day rule works, and what the creditor needs from you

  The federal timing rule that runs inside the settlement this section is written about

• The federal lead-based paint disclosure rule, in its own words

  A second federal statute that trebles what a violation costs, and names the agent as well

Sources

Every quotation above is taken from the documents below, on the date shown; the explanation around each quote is ours. Statutes are amended and uniform acts are revised — check the current text before relying on any of it.

1. [1] 12 U.S.C. §2608 — Title companies; liability of seller — Office of the Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml, read September 1, 2026
2. [2] 12 U.S.C. §2602 — Definitions — Office of the Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml, read September 1, 2026
3. [3] 12 CFR §1024.16 — Title companies (eCFR, current as of August 31, 2026) — Office of the Federal Register / Government Publishing Office, www.ecfr.gov/current/title-12/chapter-X/part-1024/subpart-B/section-1024.16, read September 1, 2026
4. [4] 12 CFR §1024.2 — Definitions (eCFR, current as of August 31, 2026) — Office of the Federal Register / Government Publishing Office, www.ecfr.gov/current/title-12/chapter-X/part-1024/subpart-A/section-1024.2, read September 1, 2026
5. [5] 12 U.S.C. §2614 — Jurisdiction of courts; limitations — Office of the Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml, read September 1, 2026